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Evolution in Inter-firm Governance along the Transport Biofuel 
Value Chain in Maritime Silk Road Countries 
Abstract 
We investigate how value chain governance can evolve in the transport biofuel sector 
beyond logistics and operations optimization, drawing on cases of eighteen manufacturers 
in four Belt and Road countries. We find that key motivations for vertical integration include 
control of strategic factors such as security of supply and gaining access to the retail market, 
subject to inter-institutional and intra-organizational barriers. We contribute to a theory of 
governance mode selection by suggesting plural governance mode offers a key strategic 
choice under institutional constraints. In BRI countries, plural mode could be less disruptive 
when integrating value chains. 
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The use of biofuel as a transport fuel has a long history, but large-scale production of 
transport fuels is a rather recent development in the last four decades, beginning with the 
Brazilian National Alcohol Programme in 1975. By the late 1990s, it has become a global 
trend with more than 50 countries implementing some sort of biofuel production or 
consumption policies (IEA, 2011). The growth increased significantly after 2000, led by the 
U.S., which has become the largest producer, exporter and consumer of biofuel.  By 2017, 
total global production of biofuel was 84 million tonnes of oil equivalent, about 3% of the 
global transport energy consumption (BP, 2018; EIA, 2017).  
This industry was built on a complicated political economy landscape, where the ecosystems 
of the oil and the agricultural industries interact with each other. There is a substantial 
literature investigating various aspects of the industry in terms of policy (Sorda et al., 2010), 
environmental impacts (Searchinger et al., 2008), land competition, food and poverty 
interactions (Murphy et al., 2011), supply chain optimization (Xie & Huang, 2018), and 
technology advances (Escobar et al., 2009; Huang & Chen, 2014)). Nevertheless, there has 
been little work to understand the nature and factors behind the formation of inter-firm 
governance structures, as well as the dynamics of changing governance structure over time 
and space (AEA, 2009:613). The challenges faced by biofuel industries can be seen as 
exemplars of sustainable supply chain management in general, defined as “integration of 
economic, environmental and social dimensions into the management of intra- and inter-
organizational flows, through innovative and collaborative approaches, with the objective of 
creating sustainable value” (Bentahar & Benzidia, 2018). 
Selecting the inter-firm governance mode, also referred to as the coordination among firms, 
is among the most important strategic decisions for managers of a firm.  The concept of 
"governance" describes "inter‐firm relationships and institutional mechanisms through 
which non‐market co‐ordination of activities in the chain takes place" (Humphrey & Schmitz, 
2008).  
We provide contributions in terms of applying theories of inter-firm governance to new 
sectors relevant to transportation and logistics, in the context of a major regional integration 
scheme (the Belt and Road Initiative or BRI). We also add two new governance modes to 
the inter-firm governance mode hierarchy (regulatory captive and plural mode), in addition 
to the traditional relational governance mode prevalent in this maritime belt across South 
East Asia, where there is a strong influence of Chinese diaspora businesses (Dieleman & 
Sachs, 2006). 
In the context of the BRI, we argue that it is essential, for firms and policy makers alike, to 
understand the implications of different governance modes along the chain. Otherwise, it is 
neither easy to design a good policy that would facilitate the development and integration of 
an industry, nor conducive for firms to integrate and operate efficiently in an increasingly 
globalized value chain structure (Meixell & Gargeya, 2005).  
Within BRI, there has been a policy push, led by the Chinese government, to increase 
integration of various value chains across Belt and Road countries. For instance, China’s 
President Xi Jinping stated at the Boao Forum for Asia that “China's investment 
opportunities are expanding … in infrastructure connectivity … in new technologies, new 
products, new business patterns, and new business models are constantly springing up.” (Xi, 
2015) Moreover, there is increasing trade in intermediate and finished goods within BRI 
 3 
countries (Boffa, 2018). Integration can promote trade and efficiency, but there are inherent 
risks and difficulties.  
While there have been extensive discussions of integrating BRI value chains with regard to 
major infrastructure projects (Huang, 2016), there has been limited examination of other 
sectors which could have equally complicated value chains and sensitive institutional 
landscapes, such as in energy and agriculture.  In laying out its BRI Action Plan, the Chinese 
government describes the need “to create an integrated industrial chain of energy and 
resource cooperation” (State Council, 2015).  In particular, we focus here on the transport 
biofuel sector, which operates at the crossroads of energy and agriculture and hence offers 
insights into both of these important sectors. 
 
We analyze the forces behind the evolution of the fuel-ethanol (the leading form of biofuels) 
industry by examining the dynamics of governance along its value chain: 
 
i) To explore the differences in the structure of the fuel-ethanol industry and its evolution 
in emerging economies. We seek to characterize and analyze, in detail and with the 
support of empirical evidence, the structure of the industry - in terms of entrants and their 
capabilities, and vertical integration movement along the value chain in the selected 
countries along the Maritime Silk Road. 
ii) To map inter-firm governance modes along the value chain and examine their 
determinants through the lens of major theories in the organization of economic 
institutions.  
Section 2 offers a critical review of three major theoretical perspectives influencing inter-
firm relationship and governance. Section 3 lays out the analytical framework we adopt, 
which is based on the Global Value Chain governance structure. Section 4 explains the 
choice of multiple in-depth case study method and the selection of the four main ethanol 
producing countries along the Maritime Silk Road, i.e. China, Thailand, Vietnam and the 
Philippines. The transport fuel-ethanol value chain can be divided into three distinct groups 
or stages - upstream (agro-commodity), midstream (ethanol manufacturing), and 
downstream (transport fuel distribution and retail). In Section 5, we draw on interviews with 
eighteen major manufacturers in these four BRI countries and use them to map out the 
governance structure along the value chain. Section 6 offers discussion of new insights 
gained as to the motives and the reasons for selecting certain governance structures and 
makes theoretical contributions to the understanding of strategic determinants of a manager's 
choice of governance mode.  Context-specific critical success factors of an industry are the 
paramount considerations in these decisions and other explanatory factors are found to play 
smaller roles. As discussed in Section 7, the nature of the permeability of value chain 
boundaries, the firm's resources and country's specific institutional factors are among the 
key constraints in governance mode choice. Firms also deploy plural modes to mitigate 
uncertainty and opportunism. 
 
2. Three theoretical perspectives in inter-firm governance 
Over the last three decades, scholars have tried to decode the structure, provide 
classifications, explain the rationales and determinants, and evaluate the performance of 
various choices and types of inter-firm governance modes (Gulati & Singh, 1998). Most 
empirical case studies (Monteverde & Teece, 1982; Masten, 1984; Klein, 1988; Joskow, 
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1985) focused on make-versus-buy decisions in various sectors. Our approach is similar to 
that of Reeves et al (2010), which employs the resource-based view and the lens of 
transaction costs in the context of the outsourcing decisions in the automotive supply 
industry.   
The review article by Klein (2004) provides an extensive overview on cases of vertical 
integration citing other determinants based on transaction cost theory, characteristics of a 
firm and sector, as well as other exogenous factors. Below, we critically review three main 
perspectives in interpreting the logics of this make-or-buy decision: 
2.1 Efficiency as a decision criterion for choice of inter-firm coordination 
This tradition could be traced back to Adam Smith's view of division of labor. Firms are 
initially vertically integrated as suppliers of intermediate goods and would not find the 
economies of scale to justify involvement. However, as production increases during the 
evolution of the industry, various stages of the production process spin off into specialized 
firms that can produce more efficiently with a much higher volume (Young, 1928; Stigler, 
1951). This technological economic point of view also explains re-integration due to the 
advancement of technology. Technology enables the combination of production processes 
resulting at a lower cost. 
Nevertheless, the technological perspective only considers production cost and neglects 
transaction cost (Coase, 1937). Williamson (1985) argued that the pattern of inter-firm 
relationship in an industry reflects the minimization of the sum of production costs and 
transaction costs, where this transaction cost theory (TCT) perspective has gained 
prominence over the past decades (Peltzman, 1991; Whinston, 2003). Hierarchy and market 
are viewed as two extreme ends of a spectrum of governance modes, where intermediate 
governance mechanisms are such as short or long-term contracts, networks, alliances and 
relational arrangements. The decision to select any of the alternative governance structures 
is based on the relative costs of the transaction, such as the costs of acquiring and handling 
information about the quality of inputs, the prices, and the suppliers, as well as costs of 
negotiating, writing, monitoring, and enforcing contracts.  
Some principal-agent theorists argue that the choice of governance structure - particularly 
vertical integration mode - needs to consider any internal managerial cost for the principal, 
the acquiring firm. Dating to the 1960s, this theory suggests that agency problems occur 
when the goals of the principal and the agent are in conflict (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Does the decision on the choice of governance mode, however, rest upon finding the ideal 
(or most efficient) mode under a static economic perspective? Below, we offer another two 
alternatives: 
2.2 Macro-level institutional determinants of inter-firm coordination  
The macro-level determinants of governance structure are elements of the institutional 
environment such as the rules and norms, polity, judiciary, contract law, social norms, and 
culture in a particular setting or country. These shape the formation of inter-firm 
relationships. Williamson (1996) himself has acknowledged that previous research in the 
TCT tradition has taken institutional environment as a given, which has led to some 
criticisms. A study of the Japanese auto industry suggests that formal and informal 
institutions have shaped the structure of inter-firm governance, where the institutional 
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embedded relational-governance mode prevails (Ahmadjian & Lincoln, 2001; Hemmert, 
1999). Similarly, macro-level institutional factors could be significant in the transport 
biofuel industry, in the Maritime Silk Road countries, due to the nature of its value chain - 
leading from agricultural to energy sectors. 
2.3 Evolutionary and learning perspectives of inter-firm governance 
Past studies of multinational firms suggest that a firm evolves in form in response to changes 
in its environment. From an evolutionary and learning perspective, managerial preferences 
regarding the formation of inter-firm governance changes according to resources, capability, 
knowledge, embedded transaction history as well as the technological context of the firm 
(Barney, 1991; Osborn & Hagedoorn, 1997; Teece et al., 1997; Argyres, 1996; Tallman & 
Faldmoe-Lindquist, 2002; Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1993). Research in the Japanese 
auto industry, however, demonstrates that changes in the national institutional environment 
do not necessarily lead to a modification of the governance mode (McGuire & Dow, 2003). 
Instead, changes in governance mode in the auto industry could be explained by the learning 
perspective (Dyer, 1996; Oliver & Wilkinson, 1992; Ahmadjian & Lincoln, 2001). 
In addition, a firm's growth is conditioned on, and constrained by, the resources it owns. The 
Resource-Based View (Wernerfelt, 1984), as a theory of the individual firm and its growth 
process, investigates the value-added benefits of a transaction. Instead of economizing on 
costs of transaction, as proposed by TCT, a firm could maximize the transaction value by 
exploiting and developing its resources and capabilities (Nelson & Winter, 1982).  
It is not surprising that firms in the Maritime Silk Road face constraints in resources 
including resources to organize their value chain and for expansion. The constraints of 
resources and capabilities are expected to be even more severe for small family farmers 
producing feedstock for transport biofuels.  
Therefore, in analyzing governance modes and their determinants in the biofuel industry in 
BRI countries, we cannot take a single perspective in understanding a firm's behavior. We 
agree with Hoskisson et al. (2000) that institutional forces are preeminent in shaping firms' 
strategies in interfirm coordination in emerging market economies, but other theories might 
also play an increasingly important role as the economy continues through liberalization. 
We therefore advocate a holistic approach, applying a series of different theoretical lenses 
in analyzing inter-firm formation and motivations.   
 
3. Analytical framework 
The global value chain (GVC) literature suggests that the intricacy and complexity of global 
trade requires sophisticated forms of coordination. Coordination is required not merely in 
logistics and operations, but also in fields related to the integration of product and process 
information, i.e. from design to marketing of the final products (Kaplinsky, 2000). It can be 
examined from a systems perspective, concerning all stages in the value chain. Improving 
‘systemic’ efficiency may create significant changes in the effectiveness of the entire value 
chain (Kaplinsky, 2000). To achieve this, a firm can optimize its supply chain and logistics, 
and there is already a substantial literature investigating these important aspects applied to 
the bioethanol industry (Chen & Fan, 2012; Gonela et al., 2015; Marufuzzaman et al., 2014). 
Alternatively, a firm can reconsider the governance mode chosen.  
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The GVC literature proposes three key explanatory variables of governance mode in a value 
chain: (i) the complexity of a transaction with respect to goods/services; (ii) the possibility 
of codifying information and knowledge of the transaction; and (iii) the level of supplier 
competence in relation to the requirements place upon them (Gereffi et al., 2005). GVC 
models propose five types of governance mode, on a continuum of coordination that 
describes inter-firm relationship; i.e. "modular", "relational", "captive" in-between the two 
extremes of "market" and "vertical integration".  
However, different stages of a chain might be characterized by different forms of 
governance, and the nature of coordination is dynamic over time and different market 
conditions (Gibbon & Ponte, 2005:82). Recognizing the dynamics of governance type and 
power relationships, Gereffi et al. (2005) and Humphrey and Schmitz (2008) argue that the 
nature of governance evolves over time, motivated by changes in the complexity of 
transactions and codification, and the enhancement of supplier competences - an 
evolutionary and learning perspective. 
However, many factors along the value chain and the firms are dynamic. For instance, 
supplier competencies could be enhanced over time, and the product and transaction 
requirements could become more complex too. In addition, this GVC framework, although 
capturing some important elements that influence the forms of coordination, has only limited 
explanatory power to determine the overall form of governance in a value chain (Gibbon 
and Ponte, 2005: 82). Different stages of a chain might be characterized by different forms 
of governance and the nature of coordination is dynamic over time and varies with market 
conditions. Recognizing the dynamics of governance types and power relationships, Gereffi 
et al. (2005) and Humphrey and Schmitz (2008) argue that the nature of governance evolves 
over time, motivated by changes in the complexity of transactions and codification, and the 
enhancement of supplier competences. 
We adopt the Global Value Chain approach because it provides the level of analysis 
necessary to characterize the overall configuration of governance decisions along a chain 
(Gibbon, 2008), while keeping a strong focus on specific dynamics at the micro level of 
individual stages in the chain. We analyze the coordination between firms based on four 
different types of governance mode prevailing in the industry. Additionally, two emerging 
categories are proposed, i.e. regulatory captive and plural mode.  
Hierarchical and equity-based 
This is the classical vertical integrated structure with an intra-firm governance mode. The 
firm integrates upstream or downstream to adjacent stages along the value chain and gains 
control over the operation of acquired firms. The asymmetry of power of this governance 
mode is the highest among all modes. A firm will enjoy greater security of supply in the case 
of integration with upstream feedstock farming or trading. Similarly, if the firm integrates 
downstream to blending/distribution/retailing, it will gain greater autonomy in expanding 
markets for fuel ethanol. 
Captive  
Captive governance exists when either one or both parties are locked in to the relationship. 
The global value chain literature (Gereffi et al., 2005) proposes that some degree of power 
asymmetry exists in the relationship in favor of the larger and more powerful lead firm. 
Nevertheless, the relationship can also involve a form of symbiosis. This inter-firm 
relationship could involve multiple interdependencies that ensure mutual benefits, which is 
the main element binding parties together. Therefore, switching costs might be forbiddingly 
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high under this governance mode. There are three different factors that give rise to captive 
inter-firm coordination: contractual arrangements and asset specificity; and regulatory or 
administrative directives, which we will discuss in greater detail below.  
The third factor is a new and emerging category, which we propose based on the evidence 
gathered. The relationship is a result of regulatory or administrative directives and is very 
secure as long as there is no change in government policy. However, coordination can easily 
be broken up by removing government directives even without the consent of the firms. In 
the Global Value Chain literature, there is typically no inter-firm governance mode delivered 
by the direct intervention of government. However, the evidence, as presented later, suggests 
that government action (e.g. regulations and directives) plays an important role with unique 
characteristics that other governance modes cannot possibly replicate.  
Relational 
This mode of governance is characterized by strong but informal social ties built between 
firms through reputation, long-term business exchange, trust, and various kinds of kinship. 
Tacit knowledge is exchanged between buyers and sellers and third parties might find it 
difficult to break in. If the relationship is strong, it can sustain short-term fluctuations or 
stresses and allow for the sharing of risks and costs. However, the relationship can break if 
one party feels the exchange to be unfair over an extended period. The direct switching cost 
might be low but there may be higher indirect social costs. 
Market 
Market governance mode has a low cost of switching to new partners for either party. It is 
characterized by standard product and transaction with a low informational complexity. Both 
parties are exposed to the volatility of the market and have very little influence over each 
other's operation and strategic decisions. In addition, a short-term contractual arrangement 
is categorized as market-based governance because it exhibits similar characteristics. 
Plural mode (emerging mode) 
This is an emerging mode for Global Value Chain analysis as evidenced in our data. Some 
manufacturers employ more than one type of governance mechanism simultaneously at a 
single stage of the value chain. In addition, some manufacturers also deploy a mixture of 
governance modes with respect to a single supplier for the same input or a single buyer for 
the same output.   
Plural mode has also been discussed in other settings, notably, for make-or-buy or -ally 
decisions in the sourcing literature (Heide et al., 2014; Krzeminska et al., 2013; Parmigiani, 
2007). Sako et al. (2016), having studying sourcing for legal services, call for more research 
"to continue developing plural sourcing theories and evidence relevant to different 
organizational forms in variety of industry contexts." 
Figure 1 summarizes two important characteristics of these governance modes. Ease of 
switching transaction partners is normally higher at the market end of the spectrum of 
governance modes. By contrast, the power of coordination is higher at the hierarchical end 
of the spectrum. Therefore, a firm will enjoy a higher level of security of supply if the 
governance mode of the transaction is hierarchical. Moreover, a firm employing hierarchical 
mode will be able to exercise proactive approach to develop the end-user market. In the case 
of fuel-ethanol, the manufacturer who integrates further downstream to ethanol blending and 
distribution/retail need not depend on government mandates or face reluctant or even hostile 











Figure 1: Ease of switching transaction partners and power of coordination in the 
spectrum of governance modes 
 
 
4. Methods: Multiple-case study 
BRI is a major endeavor to integrate the economies along both maritime and inland Silk 
Roads. Research has already been undertaken to consider how BRI will lead to a 
reconfiguration of logistics and transportation networks and the implications for energy 
security (Sheu & Kundu, 2017). 
 
Moreover, the value chains in and across various countries along the silk roads are governed 
under different political economy regimes and therefore understanding the governance 
modes are a crucial step for any attempt to integrate the value chains of any products and 
services.  
 
Our research adopts a multiple case study approach (Eisenhardt, 1989) to understand the 
structure and determinants of the formation of inter-firm governance modes. Giving the need 
to obtain in-depth insights of empirical phenomena and their contexts, the authors choose 
multi-case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). It also provides a unique means of 
developing a theory or refining existing theories (Dubois & Gadde, 2002). Compared to the 
classic single case study, the multiple or comparative case study approach is more objective 
and takes a positive theory-building stance (Yin, 2009; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).  
4.1 Research context and case selection 
We investigate the rapidly expanding transport biofuel value chain in four countries along 
the Maritime Silk Road, with major fuel-ethanol policy and production capacity. The four 
countries are China, Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines. The other two large southeast Asia 
countries, Indonesia and Malaysia both produce large volumes of biofuels, but both countries 
place their policy emphasis on biodiesel, which would be better served as the subject of a 
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separate study given the differences in feedstocks and supply chains. There are also active 
cross-border trading of raw material and transport biofuel among these four BRI economies. 
For example, China imports cassava root from Thailand and Vietnam, and the Philippines 
imports transport fuel-ethanol from Vietnam and Thailand.  
The transport fuel-ethanol industry was selected because the industry has developed 
extremely quickly, particularly during our main study period of 2002 - 2011. As of 2017, 
the size of the biofuel industry (where fuel-ethanol is the major type of biofuels) is about 3% 
of the global transport energy consumption (2.8 billion tonnes of oil equivalent) (BP, 2018), 
which is not insignificant. Global production growth over 2002 -2011 was rapid (15% per 
annum). Since 2012, global growth has slowed to 5% per annum (Based on F.O. Licht's 
annual World Ethanol and Biofuels Reports).   
While global biofuels went through a wave of horizontal and vertical integration over a 
decade of rapid expansion, there is little known about the structure of the value chain of key 
producers in the Maritime Silk Road and their inter-firm governance. From the Global Value 
Chain perspective, we analyze the types and determinants of governance mode in the fuel-
ethanol industry.  
Manufacturers were selected in the case-countries along the Maritime Silk Road. The four 
main selection criteria employed were: (i) size of the existing production of ethanol and fuel-
ethanol; (ii) size of the near future production - facilities in construction or announced; 
potential (iii) size of production based on indigenous feedstock; and (iv) the existence of 
domestic biofuel policies or programs (either fully implemented or in advanced discussions).  
A scoping study was performed for case-country selection with data on production and 
potential production (See Table 1a and 1b). Eighteen major manufacturers in these four 
countries were selected for analysis. We then gained access to sixteen of these leading 
manufacturers and conducted detailed interviews with top managers and relevant 
stakeholders along their value chains (5 in China, 6 in Thailand, 1 in the Philippines and 4 
in Vietnam).  
Production 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Thailand 
       
467  
       
521  
      
613  










   
1,385     1,500  
China 
    
2,466  
    
2,479  












   
3,550     3,950  
Philippines 
         
23  
         
10  
          
4  




     
115  
     
168  
     
230  
      
274        280  
Table 1a: Ethanol Production (million liters) 
 
Number of 
Refineries 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Thailand 11 19 19 19 21 21 21 21 23 22 
China 5 5 5 6 6 7 7 10 11 11 
Philippines 2 3 3 4 4 8 8 10 11 13 
Table 1b: Ethanol production in maritime silk road countries 
Source: GAIN (2017a, 2017b, 2017c) 
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Data sources and management 
The data is based primarily on field research conducted in China, Thailand, Vietnam, and 
the Philippines between 2008 and 2009 as part of a seven-month long field study. Selected 
manufacturers in these four countries were interviewed. The purpose of the interviews was 
to discover the type of inter-firm governance mode(s) which the manufacturers employed 
along every stage of the value chain and to understand their reasons for selecting a particular 
mode.  
This data was used to analyze the distribution and the fundamental forces that shape the 
inter-firm governance structure of the biofuel value chain in developing countries. Some 
additional interviews were also conducted with other players along the value chain in order 
to gain a broader view of the governance structure and to triangulate the information 
obtained. Triangulation of data is performed to double checking information (Yin, 2009; 
Denzin, 1978; Huberman & Miles, 1994) by interviewing key informants across the value 
chain.  
There were sixteen core semi-structured interviews conducted with sixteen manufacturers. 
Among the informants were senior leaders including chairmen, directors, and top managers 
of the manufacturers. The interviews lasted from about 30 minutes to over two hours. There 
were also an additional six employees of the manufacturers who were interviewed for 
clarification and better understanding of their value chain. In addition, we interviewed 
another 36 stakeholders, i.e. policy makers and researchers, employees of oil companies, 
representatives of trade associations, farmers and traders and other industry experts in the 
Maritime Silk Road. 
The majority of interviews were conducted face-to-face supplemented by a small number of 
exchanges via email, skype, and telephone. The main language was English with the 
exceptions of interviews in China, where the semi-structured questionnaire was translated 
into Chinese and most interviews were conducted in the Chinese language, since one of the 
authors is proficient in Chinese. In a few instances local research assistants helped in 
interpretation during interviews conducted in Thai and Vietnamese. Several interviews were 
audio recorded. Interview notes were taken in all instances, in particular when the 
interviewees objected to any audio recording. Local research assistants were also employed 
to take notes of the interviews. The case studies were then written up and analyzed.  
 
5. Data analysis 
There are two parts to this study. First of all, Part 1 examines the level of integration of 
these top eighteen Maritime Silk Road manufacturers from across four leading BRI 
economies. Then, a discussion on the trend in particular comparing it with the structure of 
the global top forty manufacturing firms as in Chan and Reiner (2010).   
The analysis process for Part 2 involved analyzing interview data, identifying the inter-firm 
governance modes and their determinants along all the stages of the value chain. First, we 
designed a set of categories of governance modes based on the classification of Global Value 
Chain analysis (Gereffi, 1995). Then, data was placed into these categories - an approach 
similar to the axial coding method (Creswell, 2003). Table 2 is an example of the category 





1 Hierarchical/ vertical integration  Ownership, equity, shareholding 
2 
Captive 
Contractual Signing contract, agreement, MOU, long-term supply arrangement, accepting farm credits 
3 Regulatory (emerging) Regulation/Act/Directive, official requirement 
4 Asset specificity Spatial proximity, time/cost of transport 
5 Relational  
Long-term business partner, relationship, trust, 
old friend, reputation 
6 Market  
Selling based on price, no long-term 
relationship, ease of switching partners 
7 Plural mode (emerging)  Using more than a single mode from the above 
Table 2: Category tree diagram 
5.1 Vertical integration in the transport fuel-ethanol industry 
As the industry grew, there has been a strong trend towards merger and acquisition in the 
global ethanol value chain (Chan & Reiner, 2010). A firm's history and the market structure 
of the industry can have a substantial effect on firm performance, (Klepper & Simons, 2000; 
Carroll et al., 1996; Mitchell, 1991). These firms have been classified, based on their 
industry of origin, into: (i) Technology, engineering and construction firms; (ii) Farmer and 
farmer cooperatives, and agro-food and sweetener manufacturers; (iii) Agriculture 
commodities traders; (iv) De novo entrepreneurial start-ups; and (v) Oil firms. Their vertical 
involvement in the value chain has also been investigated. 
The eighteen largest ethanol manufacturers in these four countries have been selected for 
analysis. From the results of interviews and other secondary sources, Table 3 provides an 
overview of the role each of these major manufacturers plays along the value chain and the 
scale of operation.  Estimation on market share is based on the production capacity because 
sales figures are not available although many facilities will have operated at differing 
utilization rates throughout the years. Nevertheless, capacity share still provides a fairly 
reliable picture of their respective market power due to the homogeneous nature of ethanol.  
In China, the largest manufacturer is COFCO(9)1, a state-owned conglomerate in agro-
commodity trading. COFCO holds majority stakes in three out of five fuel-ethanol facilities 
in China. It also has a 20% stake in a CNPC(17)-controlled facility in Jilin. CNPC is the 
largest Chinese state-owned oil firm. The other ethanol manufacturer, which has license to 
produce fuel-ethanol, is Tianguan(1) in Henan province, in which the provincial government 
has some interest. Another giant state-owned oil firm, Sinopec(16), is also integrated 
upstream to ethanol manufacturing. Its first ethanol facility with controlling stake is still 
under construction. Nonetheless, the two major private manufacturers, Jian Shenghua (2) 
and Taixing (3), produce bio-ethanol but do not have any license to sell in the fuel market. 
In 2010, Petrogreen(4) of the Mitr Phol sugar group was the largest producer in Thailand, 
capturing almost 50% of the fuel-ethanol market share from the production at its four 
                                               
1 The ID number of the company as in Table 2. 
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facilities (GOT-DEDE, 2010). Its position is being challenged by PTK Ethanol (12), which 
is constructing the largest ethanol facility in Thailand.   
In Vietnam, the state oil company PetroVietnam invested directly and indirectly in three out 
of four major fuel-ethanol plants, i.e. Petrosecto(11), PVB(15), and PVOil(28). However, 
all three plants were still under construction at the end of 20102. Minh Anh, the largest 
private cassava trader and exporter, controls DongXanh (8), the only major producing plant 
in Vietnam at the time of the study.3  
In the Philippines, there are only three operating fuel-ethanol distilleries, with a total 
capacity of 70 million liters per year in 2010 (GAIN, 2010). San Carlos Bioenergy(14) is the 
only major operating plant with an annual capacity of about 35 million liters. As clearly 
depicted in Table 3, the permeability of boundaries at the manufacturing stage is high. There 
is heterogeneity of entrants from neighboring industries from either upstream or downstream 
of the value chain into the manufacturing stage. The findings agree with similar observations 
for leading global manufacturers in Chan and Reiner (2010). 
Agro-food producers and commodity traders building on their capability in sourcing of 
feedstock have integrated downstream to ethanol manufacturing - forming vertical 
integration governance mode at these stages. Examples of companies include major sugar 
groups - Petrogreen(4), Rungroung(5), Thai Sugar(7), cassava chip traders - Sapthip(10) and 
DongXanh(8) and agro-commodity giant - COFCO(9). Similarly, oil companies in China 
and Vietnam are also integrated upstream into the ethanol manufacturing stage.  
Nonetheless, there is no major engineering firm diversifying into ethanol manufacturing in 
East and South East Asia as shown in Table 3. However, there is an example of upstream 
integration by Taixing(3) in China, which has diversified into plant building and engineering 
design as it is the builder of the DongXanh(8) distillery4. Taixing(3) has capitalized on its 
experience in the construction and operation of its own distillery. 
Nonetheless, our study does not observe any trend towards extensive vertical integration as 
seen among their global counterparts (Chan & Reiner, 2010). Neither any evidence of further 
downstream integration to gain access to the market for ethanol by the upstream players, nor 
has there been any further upstream integration to secure the supply of feedstock by the oil 
companies as shown in Table 3. But, what are the reasons for these differences? The next 
section investigates governance structures, and the explanatory factors for how these 
structures emerge. 
                                               
2 Obtained from personal conversations with 3 directors of 3 ethanol plants, between Feb - Mar 2009.  
3 Personal conversations with Chairman of Minh Anh and DongXanh, 19 - 21 Mar 2009. 
4 Personal conversation with the Chairman of DongXanh, 19 Mar 2009 and the Chairman and CEO of 
Taixing, 21 Mar 2009. 
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Table 3: Entrants and vertical integration in ethanol value chain in Maritime Silk Road  
 
Note:  
* Jian Shenghua is a privately-owned company located in the Jilin Province. It is a bio-ethanol producer 
without government permission to sell its product as fuel-ethanol. Production capacity is claimed to be 
substantially higher, but the actual production was low during 2008-2010. The company ran into financial 
trouble and was restructured at the end of 2010.  
** The author did not interview PTK Ethanol. PTK Ethanol facilities were still under construction. 




The first two columns are i) auxiliary stages of first and ii) second generation technology suppliers. The 
agro-food processing column does not belong to the fuel-ethanol value chain. It is included to show the 
industry of origin of some entrants. Cells shaded in the color of the corresponding firm denote the industry 
of origin of the firm. Whereas, cells shaded in green indicate new business stages along the value chain that 
the firm is involved in.  
 Engineering and construction company who builds plants and supplies technology 
 Farmer/farmer cooperative and agro-food processor with a history in alcohol/sweetener production 
 Global/National agro-commodity trader 
 De novo entrepreneurial start-up with minimum or no background in the supply chain 
 Oil company, either integrated or in downstream business 
 Involvement in a stage of ethanol value chain 
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5.2 Cross-case comparison of governance mode 
This section presents the cases and stories of manufacturers' value chain governance 
structures and their determinants. The top sixteen manufacturers in the four case-countries 
were selected and interviewed. The detailed analysis of the cases in these four countries 
along the Maritime Silk Road, with evidence collected from interviews and field 
observations, are available in the Online Supplement. We examine the inter-firm 
governance mode and the motivations for the formation of each mode at every stage along 
the fuel-ethanol value chain. 
This section distils the information from the sixteen cases discussed in the Online 
Supplement using a proposed matrix (see Figure 2) to combine the governance modes of 
the entire value chain of these cases. The inter-firm governance mode of every stage along 
the value chain of an ethanol manufacturer is mapped onto the matrix. This figure shows a 
complex landscape of inter-firm governance modes across the value chain. 
Table 4 summarizes the main determinants of governance mode according to the three major 
theoretical perspectives, i.e. efficiency, institutional, evolutionary and learning. Table 4 also 
shows the list of cases from whom corresponding evidence was collected to support the 
analysis. Institutional factors are among the most prominent determinants of governance 
mode, irrespective of the effects on the value chain. However, there are two factors that 
clearly emerge from the analysis of the data, i.e. security of supply and access to retail market. 
These two motivations encourage manufacturers to consider alternative governance modes 
in both upstream (security of supply) and downstream (access to retail market) stages.  
Moreover, amid various institutional barriers, manufacturers employ a number of strategies 
to enhance security of supply and access to the retail market, as shown in Table 5. In many 
cases, ethanol manufacturers have very little influence on the price of feedstock because they 
are minor actors in the market. They therefore consider a type of governance arrangement 
which enables a high power of coordination to secure their critical production factor – the 
feedstock. However, vertical integration into feedstock supply chain is not always possible, 
particularly when subject to institutional barriers. In that case, they deploy a range of 
governance modes to diffuse the risks of supply. 
There are also manufacturers trying to overcome resource constraints and institutional 
barriers in downstream integration. The size of the ethanol market is not only constrained by 
government policy but also the willingness of oil companies to provide access. Oil 





Figure 2: Distribution of inter-firm governance modes along ethanol value chain in 
Maritime Silk Road 
Note: Data is based on interviews with senior management of the manufacturers. 
 
Legend: 
Number in a shape is the case identification number. 
Color denotes the industry of origin for the manufacturer. 
 Diamond: China (1,2,3,9,16 and 17)  Circle: Thailand (4,5,6,7,10,12 and 13) 
 Oval: The Philippines (14)  Square: Vietnam (8,11,15,18) 
 
Bold borderline denotes main mode of 
governance  
Dashed borderline denotes governance 
mode under development 
 Farmer/farmer cooperative & agro-food processor, experience in alcohol/sweetener production 
 Global/national agro-commodity trader 
 De novo entrepreneurial start-up with minimum or no background in the supply chain 




Key aspects of the determinants Case number as 
in Figure 2 
Upstream stages (Farming-trading-manufacturing) 
Efficiency 
perspective 
Despite incurring substantial transaction costs in obtaining 
feedstock, manufacturers have limited choices in altering the 




Socialist land policy, small farm size and high number of poor 
and uneducated farmers are among structural factors that 
determine the prominent governance mode. 
Business norms determine how a manufacturer deals with 
traders and farmers.  
Long-term relationship is a cultural element that has been used 






Manufacturers try to work with farmers to enhance security of 
supply. They have to work to upgrade the capability and 
knowledge of farmers in order for them to comprehend a 





Security of feedstock supply is a main concern prompting 
manufacturers to choose vertical integration or use multiple 
modes.  




Downstream stages (Manufacturing-blending-distribution-retailing) 
Institutional 
perspective  
Government policy is the main factor that prevents downward 
vertical integration by manufacturers. It also prevents entrance 
into the fuel-ethanol market. 
1,2,3,4,9 
In contrast, government policy is also the main factor that 
encourages forward integration to manufacturing by oil 
companies. 
16,17,18 (partly 




Limitation in resources and capability prevents manufacturer 
integrating downstream. 4,10,14 
Emerging 
factor 
Access to retail market is a motivation for firm integrating or 
planning to integrate downstream 4,11,15 
Table 4: Determinants of governance mode  
Note: Data is based on interviews with senior management of the manufacturers. 
 
Strategy of manufacturer Case number as in Figure 2 
Upstream stages (Farming-trading-manufacturing) 
Vertical integration - reducing transaction cost and 
increasing security of supply  4,5,6,7,9,10,11,15 
Relational approach in addition to market-based 1,2,3,8,9,10,11,13,14,17 
Multiple governance modes - on a single supplier or different 
mode for different supplier to diffuse risks of feedstock 
supply  
1,2,3,6,9,10,11,13,14,15,17,18 
Downstream stages (Manufacturing-blending-distribution-retailing) 
Vertical integration  11,17,18. and 4,15 (in planning) 
Multiple governance modes 4, 10,11,15,17 
Table 5: Strategy of manufacturers in governance mode selection  




In summary, we offer five main observations: 
1.) At the upstream stages, the market governance mode is the dominant mode between 
farmer and trader; farmer and manufacturer; and trader and manufacturer. However, it is not 
a pure market mechanism in their transactions. In a large number of cases, market factors 
are intertwined with relational considerations and constrained by asset specificity. Asset 
specificity becomes an overriding factor of governance mechanism particularly for farmers 
when their harvest cannot be transported long distances without prohibitive costs or 
compromising the quality. By contrast, traders (of corn or cassava) do not encounter this 
particular problem because they have altered the characteristics of the products (via drying 
to reduce weight and increase life). 
2.) The group of manufacturers who can employ the hierarchical governance mode in 
procuring feedstock will enjoy the highest level of security of supply. For the majority of 
them, their industry of origin is in either feedstock farming, in trading or in the processing 
sector. They have integrated forward to ethanol manufacturing forming a hierarchical 
governance structure. 
3.) For manufacturers without any history in the feedstock sector, the risks associated with 
feedstock supply and price volatility are high. It is desirable for them to find a governance 
mode that offers a high power of control such as hierarchical or contractual captive modes 
of coordination. Nevertheless, these governance arrangements are rare as shown in Figure 
2. The primary reasons are constraints in firm level resources and, most importantly, macro-
level institutional barriers for farm acquisitions. These firms, therefore, employ multiple 
governance modes to diffuse the risk of supply. 
4.) The majority of ethanol manufacturers will need to sell their product based on a market 
governance mode to oil companies who dominate downstream blending, distribution and 
retail segments. The exceptions are the Chinese firms, which could only sell their product to 
designated state-owned oil companies as directed by the central government. Moreover, 
there are also a few oil firms that have integrated backward to ethanol manufacturing, with 
controlling or minority stakes. 
5.) Due to a highly regulated downstream market, ethanol manufacturers encounter high 
barriers to downstream integration. Despite this, some manufacturers see downstream 
integration as the key step to breaking the domination of oil companies in blending and 
distribution. It is a strategic move to expand the market by reaching out to end customers 
and selling high ethanol blended fuel. 
 
6. Discussion and propositions 
The findings suggest there are three important forces at play in the evolution of governance 
structures: security of supply, access to retail market, and permeability of stage boundaries. 
In taking the value chain perspective, we propose that critical success factors - two of the 
emerging factors as in Table 5 - of an industry are important strategic determinants of 
governance structure. In the case of the fuel-ethanol industry, security of supply for 
feedstock is crucial for the viability of the manufacturer. Irrespective of the type of 
governance mode, the manufacturer's primary objective is to ensure availability of feedstock, 
at a desirable price. As a new substitute in competition with a powerful incumbent, the 
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manufacturer has to be decisively proactive. Breaking the grip of the incumbent and gaining 
market access is crucial for the long-term growth and survival of the biofuel industry. 
Selection of the governance mechanism becomes an important strategic decision to achieve 
this objective. 
Based on the above evidence and analysis of these cases, we offer five propositions, as 
follows: 
Proposition 1: In a resource-intensive industry, firms organize themselves to secure 
strategic supplies of resources using an inter-firm governance mode with a high level 
of controlling power such as hierarchy. Security of supply - as a key success factor for 
firms - is an important determinant of the governance mode. 
An ethanol manufacturer could have a production cost exposure of as high as 60% on 
feedstock (depending on the price of feedstock and other inputs which are also fluctuating). 
As feedstock cost and ethanol output price are de-coupled, therefore, a manufacturer has to 
mitigate the risk of its margin being squeezed from both ends. High security of supply with 
a low risk of price volatility is the key success factor for an ethanol manufacturer. There is 
a higher performance and stability for entrants with a history in upstream stages of trading 
and farming of feedstock. In addition, some manufacturers are integrating upstream in order 
to ensure security of supply.  
Proposition 2: The limitation in firm's resources and macro level determinants are the 
barriers to the firm integrating further upstream into farming.  
Although a fully equity-based upstream integration to farming will provide the greatest 
security of supply, not all ethanol manufacturers are able to do so. Moreover, there are more 
hierarchical relationships in the manufacturer-trader link than in trader/manufacturer-
farming link. Vertical integration to farming may encounter high barriers where there are 
numerous institutional and resources considerations such as the socio-cultural practices 
found in the rural agricultural economy; regulation of land use/right/ownership, financial 
and human capital to manage farmers/contracts, acquire land and working capital, and secure 
access to information and networks.  
Proposition 3: Firms, which are unable to integrate further upstream, employ multi-
governance modes to diffuse the risk of security of supply.  
Despite the fact that upstream integration would provide higher security of supply, some 
manufacturers employ multiple governance modes to diffuse the risk when they are unable 
to integrate further upstream. The traditional agricultural commodity market comprises of 
layers of middleman as traders, who play a number of crucial roles in this rural agricultural 
setting by holding resources such as information, relationships, transportation infrastructure 
and credits. Although the exchange is nominally market-based, it is tainted with a time/space 
specific captive and relational elements. In these circumstances, manufacturers use a number 
of means to procure feedstock, as shown in the first column of Figure 2.  
In addition to sourcing from open markets, firms employ governance modes: hierarchical 
arrangements, varying lengths of contractual arrangement, capture mechanisms, and 
relational coordination to purchase feedstock. Similarly, at the other end of the value chain, 
some firms employ various modes of coordination to market their product. On one hand, an 
ethanol manufacturer may enter into a medium-term supply contract with oil companies in 
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order to establish a more stable market. On the other hand, the same manufacturer can 
reserve some of its produce to be sold in the spot market. With an appetite for higher 
potential profit in the spot market, the manufacturer is willing to stomach a higher risk.  
Proposition 4: The heterogeneity of entrants at the manufacturing stage is due to the 
high permeability of stage boundaries. 
In the absence of technological barriers, the midstream manufacturing stage is highly 
permeable as suggested by the intensity of integration from neighboring stages shown in 
Table 3. The exception to this is China, which has imposed high regulatory barriers. But the 
actual risks are on feedstock supply and pricing. Some manufacturers, benefitting from their 
corporate pre-entry knowledge and resources in feedstock supply, are able to cushion supply 
risks better but others suffer at a time of volatile supply and price of feedstock.  
Proposition 5: A firm producing a new product substituting those of incumbents 
requires a high level of control over its marketing channels, which could be better 
achieved by an inter-firm governance mode with a high level of controlling power such 
as the hierarchical governance mode. 
Access to market is another critical success factor for the long-term growth of the ethanol 
business. The downstream stages in these four countries are largely dominated by state-
owned and global oil companies. Despite government support, the development of the 
industry is at the mercy of the strategy of these large actors. As incumbent of the motor fuel 
market, they have extensive interests, particularly those with excess refinery capacity or 
upstream oil businesses. Manufacturers in Thailand and Vietnam have an appetite for 
downstream integration to gain access to market particularly exploring high-blend fuels with 
20% to 85% of ethanol. But there are regulatory barriers, particularly in Thailand and China. 
As an example of the challenges, in Vietnam, the pilot rollout of gasohol by a private 




The nature of inter-firm governance in the transport biofuels industry has yet to receive 
sufficient attention in comparison to the vast amount of study in the automotive industry. In 
view of the complexity of this newly formed but rapidly growing industry, little is known 
about the structure of inter-firm governance in producing countries along the Maritime Silk 
Road; i.e. China, Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines. By offering a deep contextual 
understanding of the industry in these countries, our study provides a rich description of the 
formation and evolution of inter-firm governance structures along the value chain. It 
provides insights to managers and firms working along the Silk Road in their decision in 
inter-firm governance choices. We offer some explanations for the forces driving the 
changes of governance mechanisms with reference to major theoretical perspectives in 
industrial organizations. This insight could possibly extend beyond the transport biofuel 
sector to other sectors integrating along the Silk Road.  
Our study contributes to the understanding of inter-firm relationships as well as providing 
some insights - for managers and policy makers - especially those from developing countries 
- of the governance challenges in the fuel-ethanol industry, which hinder competitiveness. 
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The insight from the four-country studies suggests that two important determinants; i.e. 
security of supply and access to market, emerge as undercurrents in shaping the inter-firm 
governance mode along the value chain of the fuel-ethanol industry. Under the shadow of 
larger competitors for feedstock, ethanol manufacturers experiment with multiple 
governance modes to diffuse the risks of feedstock supply and pricing fluctuation. However, 
the permeability of upstream stage boundaries can be extremely low. Important barriers are 
those such as social-cultural, information and relationship, financial and human capacity and 
government policy. Because of low technological barriers, the permeability of the midstream 
manufacturing stage is high as evidenced by substantial integration from neighboring 
industries coming from both downstream and upstream stages. Despite a strong motivation 
to gain access to the market as a substitute for the existing incumbent product, efforts by 
ethanol manufacturers to integrate downstream encounters low permeability of stage 
boundaries due to regulatory and capital barriers. Moreover, we observe a phenomenon of 
evolving governance modes. As the industry develops from its infancy, firms are learning 
and experimenting in governance modes to mix and match with local institutional and 
relational factors.  
Reflecting on how existing theoretical perspectives explain the forces shaping the formation 
of the governance structure, we find complementarity of the four theoretical perspectives 
(see Section 2) in provided relevant explanations of the empirical phenomena. Similarly, a 
manager will need to take a holistic perspective in evaluating the choice of governance 
mode(s), weighting the prevalent factors that dictate the decision.  
We find that security of supply and access to the end customer are the two critical strategic 
factors that motivate firms to seek vertical integration at this specific stage of the transport 
bio-ethanol industry's development. Our study proposes a new theoretical perspective in 
which an inter-firm governance structure evolves out of critical success factors analysis on 
an industrial level.  
7.2 Contributions 
Drawing on our analysis of the empirical data gathered, we have sought to make 
contributions to three broad streams of literature as well as to strategic thinking for managers 
considering re-structuring their value chain governance in similar industries.  
(1) Entrant: Pre-entry resources and capabilities 
Chan & Reiner (2010) demonstrated the heterogeneity of entrants and their pre-entry's 
resources and capabilities in the early stages of development in the fuel-ethanol industry. In 
addition, we also argue that some pre-entry resources are more crucial than others and the 
degree of difficulty in acquiring those resources may differ. We substantiate these claims 
with empirical data that the upstream feedstock sourcing capability is of high importance. It 
requires a longer period to acquire in a market, especially where a relational governance 
mode is very prominent. This finding contributes to the understanding of new entrants and 
early stages of an industry life cycle such as works of Geroski (1995), Klepper and Simon 
(2000), and Helfat and Lieberman (2002).  
(2) Evolutionary economics: forces shaping the dynamics of evolution 
We identify four fundamental forces responsible for the evolutionary dynamic in the 
industry: (i) permeability of industry boundaries, which eases active entries from 
neighboring industries creating a topology of entrants as noticed by Fransman (2001) when 
analyzing the telecommunications industry; (ii) security of supply of crucial inputs, which 
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motivates managers to consider vertical relationships; (iii) access to the retail market by 
breaking through the monopoly of well-established incumbents, which also motivates 
managers to consider vertical relationships in downstream stages; and (iv) macro-level 
institutional factors such as government policy and the social-political structure of the 
agricultural sector. 
(3) Determinants of inter-firm governance mode 
We deploy four main strains of theory and lenses to examine inter-firm coordination in the 
biofuel value chain: (i) economic theories based on efficiency maximization, such as 
transaction cost theory and agency theory; (ii) macro-institutional perspective; (iii) 
evolutionary and learning perspective; and (iv) global commodity/value chain perspective.  
There are multiple factors that motivate and constrain managers in selecting governance 
modes. We find a necessarily contextual approach has been employed in governance mode 
choice. Managers make decisions taking into consideration the political, industrial and 
market-based exogenous factors as well as the firm's internal resources and capabilities.  
i) Strategic factors as determinant: security of supply and access to market 
We demonstrate two additional determinants of inter-firm governance mode: 
(a)  A firm organizes its relationship with other firms along its value chain to secure the 
supply of critical resource(s) by deploying the governance mode with the highest 
level of controlling power; e.g., in a hierarchical arrangement ("security of supply"). 
This is especially important for a firm to survive in an industry with high resource 
intensity and/or in a very competitive resource market; 
(b) A firm, producing new products that substitute for the product of a well-established 
incumbent requires a greater control over its marketing channels, which could be 
better achieved by the type of governance mode with greater control; e.g., 
hierarchical arrangements ("access to the retail market"). These two determinants of 
governance mode have been described in Perry (1988:206) and Porter (1980) but 
have not been the subject of much empirical analysis.  
Our findings provide empirical evidence on the two determinants described above 
regarding security of supply and the effort to seek greater control in the retail market. 
Under these market conditions, firms are inclined to choose coordination mechanisms 
capable of ensuring supply of critical resources and exerting greater control over retail 
marketing channels. Although there is no general theory for vertical integration as 
suggested by Joskow (2010), these two determinants are among the leading motivations 
for why a firm may choose to internalize transactions instead of employing other modes 
of coordination over which they would have less control.   
ii) From ideal type to plural modes  
 
We have also put forward a third proposition on plural governance modes based on the 
phenomenon observed in the fuel-ethanol industry. Most firms do not confine themselves 
to adopting a single mode of governance for any given stage of a value chain. Although 
there might be an ideal type of governance under some conditions, organizations 
simultaneously deploy distinct coordination mechanisms for a function in the value chain 
for various reasons, such as mitigating against uncertainty and opportunism.  
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The observations on plural mechanism are not new, particularly in the upstream activities 
in sourcing. The sourcing literature also refers to plural and other terminology such as 
dual, concurrent or parallel sourcing (Parmigiani & Mitchell, 2009). Walker and Weber 
(1984) postulated a tactical motive of automotive firms employing and changing 
governance modes in order to learn about the operation of suppliers. When a firm makes 
as well as buys, it will acquire information allowing it to manage suppliers and gain 
insights regarding suppliers (Bradach & Eccles, 1989). Other preconditions for plural 
sourcing are demand uncertainty, technological volatility, information asymmetry, and 
complementarity in knowledge and incentives and learning or dynamic capacity building 
(Sako et al., 2016). 
We propose including the plural governance mechanism in the Global Value Chain 
analytical structure, which could also represent the concurrent governance strategy 
deployed by any lead firm in a GVC analysis. In addition, plural governance mode could 
also be applied to a single supplier or downstream channel.  
 
7.3 Practical implications in BRI context 
Our study demonstrates that normative institutional factors are important consideration for 
firms in their selection of governance mode. Scott (1995) has argued that such institutional 
factors are important in establishing legitimacy in specific social settings. For the four Asian 
countries we have selected, relational governance mode operates in these BRI countries, in 
addition to market-based transactions. Particularly in China, relational institutions built on 
long-term personal ties continue to prevail even though the use of impersonal legal-based 
contracts has become more common in its increasingly market-driven economy (Zhou et al., 
2008). Firms should consider institutional factors in host countries, such as the importance 
of establishing long-term relationships rather than simply aiming exclusively at achieving 
low cost production from a transaction cost perspective.  
As value chains in BRI economies are increasingly integrated (Boffa, 2018), the coercive 
effects of formative institutional factors could become key barriers for firms. In the fuel-
ethanol market, we find that formative institutional factors are coercive forces in distribution 
and retailing segments in the BRI countries. By contrast, market-based modes are prevalent 
between manufacturers and blenders of fuels in Thailand and Vietnam, but not in China. 
Moreover, trading of raw materials and finished biofuels are increasing across these BRI 
economies. Given the diversity across just the four BRI countries we consider, a plural 
governance mode should be considered in any further cross-border integration of transport 
biofuel value chain in order to gain legitimacy in the host country. 
 
7.4 Limitations and future work  
Our study is based on data from a single industry in one region and so we need to take care 
in drawing inferences from our study. Nevertheless, the propositions we offer should be 
further examined using similar methodologies and verified in the sectors with similarly 
complicated value chain landscapes.  Geographically, we would want to verify our findings 
in other leading ethanol producers such as Brazil and the United States. In addition, 
verification would also be required for different stages of the industry lifecycle, which might 
have different dynamics and considerations in governance mode selection.  
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The most obvious parallel in terms of sector is to biodiesel, which is produced in a somewhat 
different set of countries, notably other BRI countries like Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia 
as well as a number of European countries. Other sectors which may have similar 
characteristics include natural rubber, oils used in non-energy end uses such as palm oil and 
other forestry and genetic resources sectors. Further afield, other complicated supply chains 
include automotive supply chains, and increasingly, electricity and other energy markets. 
These are key sectors in many BRI countries. Improving our understanding of the dynamics 
of the evolution of their value chain governance would promote better integration of value 
chains, both within China and other BRI countries and across BRI countries. 
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